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L Introduction
Although a good deal of the public debate over Social Security concen-
trates on individual accounts - for proponents, the sine qua non and for
opponents, the cum qua non of reform - I view that emphasis as highly mis-
placed. Fostering saving in Social Security is a worthwhile objective, but it
is not the only, nor even the primary, issue affecting either the economy or the
imbalance within the Social Security system.
Broadly viewed, the Social Security "issue" concerns how retirement
programs should relate to the larger question of how government can change
* This paper is adapted from a presentation made at Washington and Lee School of
Law. Some portions are also taken from a series of briefs entitled "Straight Talk on Social
Security and Retirement Policy," by C. Eugene Steuerle and Adam Carasso, and can be found
at http'/www.urbaninstitute.org.
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to meet the primary needs of the people of different times. While the Social
Security debate often narrowly focuses on how to design the system for
retirees fifty or seventy-five years hence, I want to deal more generally with
how our budget can adapt over time to meet the needs of all people over those
fifty or seventy-five years. Right now, Social Security and other elderly
programs have large amounts of growth built into them in fairly rigid ways.
Legislators simply cannot create systems with that much built-in growth with-
out causing impacts far beyond the systems themselves.
Here, I will devote myself to three major areas affected by the existing
structure of growth in elderly programs. The first area is the budget. Built-in
growth does not affect just future budgets; it is already a major factor affect-
ing current budget battles. The second area is the labor force. Social Security
now induces people to retire in what must be considered late middle age. If
that trend continues as the baby boom generation retires, there will be a sig-
nificant reduction in the percentage of the adult population that will be work-
ing. The third area is the needs of the elderly. Because legislators have set
growth patterns in ways designed to address problems as they were perceived
in the past, the system has become less targeted toward the most pressing
problems of the elderly as time goes on. For example, for each additional
dollar of expenditures it makes, Social Security is targeting smaller and smaller
shares of benefits to either the poorer or the more needy among the elderly.
However, the predetermination of growth rules makes change difficult. The
structure of the existing system confronts politicians with the dilemma of
reneging on some set of promises if they want to make the system better at
meeting its basic purposes.
H. Sources of Growth in Social Security and Health Benefits
It will be helpful at the outset to take a close look at the ways that growth
has been built into our health and retirement programs. There are four major
sources of automatic growth in such programs: health program design, per-
petual growth in annual benefits for new retirees relative to those already
retired, longer retirement spans, and fertility changes that reduce the number
of workers and output relative to retirees and benefits paid.
A. Health Program Design
While most of this paper focuses on Social Security, it is important to
note that health care for the elderly faces most of the same built-in growth as
Social Security, plus more. Public health insurance essentially adopted the
model of private health insurance in its early phases of development only a
few decades ago. Essentially, health insurance is set up so that when a patient
1236
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sees a doctor, the doctor and patient bargain over what everybody else will
pay. "Everybody else" includes participants in health plans or, in the case of
public insurance, the taxpayer. Any system with roughly a zero price at the
margin tends to create an infinite demand. In the case of health care, it also
leads to a technology that tends to emphasize cost-increasing, rather than cost-
decreasing, improvements. The attempt, primarily private, to move toward
health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, and simi-
lar operations represents at its core an attempt to create an intermediary that
has some greater concern over costs. We certainly do not know how all of
this will be sorted out in the future, but the current set-up is essentially unsus-
tainable because of its built-in incentives.
B. Growth in Annual Benefits
The Social Security system uses an adjustment known as "wage-index-
ing" to ensure that if wages grow in the economy, benefits grow as well. The
net effect is that if a person earns thirty percent more than his parents during
his working life, his annual Social Security benefits are designed - at least
from this feature - to be thirty percent higher. The underlying notion is not
that individuals need so much money in absolute dollars, but rather that they
need to replace a given fraction of their former wages in retirement. If future
generations are twice as rich, by this logic, they should get twice the Social
Security benefits in their annual retirement checks.
At one level, the goal is reasonable. It follows from a life cycle view that
emphasizes individuals evening out consumption over the years. Both past and
fiture generations reasonably might want a relatively stable lifestyle overtime,
no matter what the level of that lifestyle. But imagine if we made such auto-
matic adjustments for almost everything in the budget. Certainly we might
expect that wages in the Armed Forces would follow wages in the economy;
thus, we could index them so they grew automatically at the rate of growth of
wages generally. The education budget might be automatically wage-indexed
to take into account the higher wages that teachers will deserve in the future.
Why not do the same for government workers?
The problem with this type of automatic growth becomes apparent when
carried to its logical conclusion. If a person wants to save to provide replace-
ment wages for whatever period he retires, that is a fine goal. However, a
budget financed primarily out of the current tax receipts of workers has to be
allocated according to the needs of the time. If everything is automatically
adjusted upward, there will be less - or even zero - flexibility to meet new
demands and to try new things.
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C. Longer Retirement Spans
Built-in growth in annual benefits through wage indexing generally
would be enough by itself to ensure that Social Security would always grow
as fast as the economy, even without changes in demographics or retirement
patterns. But people are also living a lot longer and retiring a lot earlier. Fig-
ure 1 shows life expectancy at the average retirement age.' Roughly speaking,
individuals are living about four to five years longer than when Social Secu-
rity benefits were first paid out, and they are retiring earlier as well. The two
trends are not strictly additive, but on net, people are living about seven or
eight more years in retirement. In point of fact, there would be no Social
Security financial crunch if people retired for the same number of years as
they did when Social Security first paid benefits.
Having more beneficiaries obviously adds to cost, but this is a leveraged
deal. Because people drop out of the workforce for much longer periods of
their lives, taxes also decline. The decline in taxes paid involves the income
tax as well as the Social Security tax and affects the ability of government to
support not just Social Security, but Medicare, education, defense, and every-
thing else. Moreover, retirees stop producing, and production is the major
source of income that supports not only government programs, but also the
workers themselves.
D. Lifetime Value of Benefits
One way to view the combined effect of rising annual benefits and more
years of retirement support is through a calculation of the present value of
benefits expected by retirees. This number represents roughly what it would
cost if those beneficiaries were to visit a life insurance company and pay up-
front for their future benefits. Their total benefits added up over time would
actually be much higher because an up-front payment would allow interest to
accumulate over time (the lifetime value calculation discounts future pay-
ments by the interest rate).
Figure 2 shows some comparisons for a one-earner couple, although the
numbers are roughly the same for two-earner couples.2 Lifetime Social Secu-
rity benefits are about $275,000 for an average-wage couple retiring today and
will grow toward $400,000 as we move into the future. The numbers are
much higher with the addition of Medicare benefits. For those born around
World War II, or early baby boomers, the total will be about $600,000 to
$700,000 in combined Social Security and Medicare benefits. Young couples
today are promised on average around $1 million in combined benefits.
1. See infra Appendix, Figure 1, at 1246.
2. See infra Appendix, Figure 2, at 1247.
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Itis not hard to come up with those types offigures if we all retire for very
long periods oftime (the longer living of atypical couple now receives benefits
for a quarter century) and absorb very high medical care costs at some point
before death. However, almost all the resources to pay for this comes in the
form of transfers from others - younger people who still work. Imagine what
might be done by society if some of that money were spent on other things,
such as education, crime prevention, or improvements in run-down geograph-
ical areas. Imagine the gains that might come from simply providing worth-
while activities for our youth throughout most of the day and the summer
months, rather than continuing an activity schedule that is structured around
the need to do chores on the farm at the end ofthe day and during the summer.
E. Baby Boomers and Declining Fertility Rates
These figures on lifetime benefits under Social Security do not reflect any
changes due to declining fertility rates and the subsequent decline in workers.
The growth in lifetime benefits is essentially independent from the baby-
bust/baby-boom/baby-bust cycles of fertility. The baby boomers have been
described as affecting the economy like a pig being swallowed by a python.
Primary and secondary education felt the effect first, then college education,
then the housing market, and, more recently, pensions. As the baby boomers
begin to retire, however, the nation is projected to undergo a dramatic decline
in workers per beneficiary from about 3.4 today to less than 2.0 within three
decades.
In demographic terms, that is a very short period of time. Normaly,
changes in fertility take seventy to ninety years to work their way fully through
the economy - essentially a full lifetime. The baby boomers, however, hide
this adjustment and force our economy to adjust in a much shorter period of
time.
Numbers on the imbalance in Social Security roughly reflect this change
in workers per beneficiary. In a pay-as-you-go system, a drop fromthree pay-
ers to two payers per beneficiary means that to maintain the same level of
transfer to the beneficiary, the taxes on each payer must go up by one-half.
Alternatively, to maintain the same tax rates on the payers, the beneficiary
must accept a cut in benefits of one-third.
HT1' The Budget Issue
In the early 1950s, the federal government's retirement and health ex-
penditures, most of which are for the elderly, comprised only about ten
percent of total expenditures.3 Today, those expenditures account for over
3. See infra Appendix, Figure 3, at 1248.
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fifty percent of the total and are rising steadily. Note that this growth oc-
curred even before the upcoming retirement of the baby boomers, when the
share of the population receiving benefits will rise significantly.
Furthermore, if one share of the budget increases, the total of all other
shares must decrease. Sniilarly, if a higher percentage of national income is
to be spent in one area, then a lower percentage must be spent elsewhere. Con-
sider the issue of education. Although several recent Presidents all claimed to
be "education" Presidents, the amount of money that they proposed to spend
on education was fairly minor relative to the annual additions to retirement and
health programs. There is little doubt in my mind that the built-in growth of
retirement and health programs has been a major constraint on what has been
proposed and enacted in other programs, such as education. I am not assessing
whether the latter growth should have been higher; rather, I am merely demon-
strating how automatic growth in one type of program preempts other options.
Figures on mandatory and discretionary spending provide still another
view of the budget impact of elderly programs. Mandatory spending repre-
sents spending that occurs automatically, whether or not Congress ever meets
or takes a vote. Discretionary spending, inturn, is that which must go through
a normal appropriations process each year. Figure 4 shows Congressional
Budget Office figures on how the federal budget divides between those two
categories.4 The large growth in mandatory spending in recent years is due
mainly to the automatic growth built in from year to year, rather than to the
enaction of new legislation.
For a long time, the decline in discretionary spending did not have a
major impact upon domestic social programs. As Figure 3 demonstrates, a
massive shift has occurred from defense to the domestic side of the budget.'
Defense expenditures at the end of the Korean conflict were about fourteen
percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Today, they consist of about three
percent of GDP. Multiplying the difference of eleven percent of GDP by this
year's GDP gives a total of about $1 trillion a year. This figure represents the
amount of the annual switch from defense spending toward domestic spend-
ing, over and above the spending levels that would have pertained had we
merely kept the allocation percentages the same as in 1950. This domestic
expenditure increase could and did occur essentially without any significant
change in the average tax rates.
Economists are not known for making very good predictions, but I will
stick my head out nonetheless. I predict that we will not witness another
eleven percentage point decline in defense spending - to minus eight percent
4. See infra Appendix, Figure 4, at 1249.
5. See infra Appendix, Figure 3, at 1248.
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of GDP - to finance yet further expansion of domestic programs. The primary
post-World War H source of increased spending for social programs will no
longer be with us, if it has not disappeared already.
In the future, budgetary trade-offs, defined as shares of the expenditure
pie, will no longer involve defense versus domestic programs. Oncethebudget
is composed mainly of domestic programs, the trade-offs to be faced must
necessarily be made among those programs. This requirement holds true
regardless of the amount of tax increases or decreases that might occur. The
shares of the federal expenditure pie must still be allocated regardless of
whether the pie is larger, smaller, or the same size.
Again, these issues are not waiting until the retirement ofthe baby boom-
ers. Figures 5 and 6 clearly illustrate the major sources of growth and decline
in spending.6 Figures 5 and 6 show that "other domestic programs" - that is,
programs other than Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid - have declined
significantly when measured as shares ofthe economy since their heyday in the
Nixon Administration. Existing projections of Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid spending will crunch these programs even more. One reason that
protests have been somewhat muted is that, for a time, the physical side ofthe
domestic budget - programs such as energy, community development, and so
forth - was able to take the hit, reducing the impact on the purer transfer pro-
grams. Thus, at least until recently, income assistance programs (excluding
Medicaid, which also grew substantially) were roughly able to hold their own,
although their share of GDP has fallen of late.
IV The Labor Force
I emphasize the impact of retirement decisions on the labor market
because, in the end, it is that market that is the most dramatically affected. An
obvious question is whether people might begin to work longer rather than
retiring, as many do now, for about one-third of their adult lives.
The lower line in Figure 7 shows the labor force participation rates of
men of age sixty-five and above over the past few decades.7 The top line
shows labor force participation rates of men with about sixteen years of life
expectancy over that period. Today, men aged sixty-five have a sixteen year
expectancy, which is significantly greater than in former years. The latter
comparison then contrasts men with roughly the same health status as defined
by life expectancy. The latter contrast in labor force participation is even
more stark than the former: about eighty-five percent of men with sixteen
6. See infra Appendix, Figures 5 & 6, at 1250-51.
7. See infra Appendix, Figure 7, at 1252.
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years of life expectancy were in the work force when Social Security was
created, as opposed to about one-third today.
This set of statistics shows the dramatic impact of a system that tells
people when they should retire and provides access to substantial benefits at
or near that age. The drop in the male labor force participation among those
with sixteen years of life expectancy does not really occur until the govern-
ment provides an option for early retirement at age sixty-two.' Then, after
1965, the government further provides Medicare benefits within a short period
of time after any early retirement. The sudden availability of benefits for
those with sixteen years of life expectancy seems to explain the drop in labor
force participation more than any linear time trend from the past. Bythe same
token, the figures suggest that a bit more work today would not be that oner-
ous, at least given that almost all men with substantially less life expectancy
and more physically demanding jobs previously worked at the ages at which
men retire today. The question that is raised is whether a seventeenth or
eighteenth year in retirement is a priority for society if it does not reflect a
need among those who receive the benefit.
I have become somewhat more sanguine about potential labor force de-
clines in the future. Most projections today are based upon assumptions that
age-sex specific labor force participation rates will remain more or less con-
stant. The lower line of Figure 7 reflects this assumption in the leveling out of
labor force participation rates for males aged sixty-five.' With the aging ofthe
population due to both mortality and fertility changes, the implication is that
we soon will witness a vast decline in the percentage of adults who work.
Closely associated with this view is the idea that people demand more
and more leisure as societies get richer. Thus, notwithstanding the short-term
trends, over the long term people will retire earlier and earlier. The difficulty
with this view is that it does not align well with the post-World War II experi-
ence. In 1948, about forty-three percent of adults were out of the labor force.
By 1997, that figure fell below thirty-five percent. If people consistently took
more leisure, then why were adult employment rates rising?
The short explanation is that while men dropped out of the workforce
more than in the past, women entered the workforce at a rate that offset the
departing men. Closely related was a social revolution that made it easier for
women to work due to factors such as reduced discrimination, smaller family
sizes, and durable goods in the home.
Suppose, however, that this growth in adult labor force participation not
only is a response to that social revolution, but also implies a much higher
8. See infra Appendix, Figure 7, at 1252.
9. See infra Appendix, Figure 7, at 1252.
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demand for labor - one that was largely met in recent decades by a group with
untapped potential. This labor demand - which, of course, derives from the
consumption demands of the population - easily might turn in the future to
other major sources of untapped potential. The largest potential source of
supply, outside of mass immigration, is among those who are in their sixties
or early seventies and still have very significant skills and abilities.
V The Needs of the Elderly
The last major issue 1 wish to address is the increasing deflection of
Social Security resources from those with greater needs - the elderly. Social
Security is one of the nation's great success stories in reducing poverty, on
average, among the elderly. Today, the elderly poverty rate is about eleven
percent, far below the thirty-five percent rate in 1960. Social Security also
protects retirees' benefits from inflation, as it should.
The success of any program, however, cannot be judged solely on how
well that program succeeds on average. In the case of Social Security, which
holds as a primary purpose the alleviation of poverty in old age, it is worth-
while to examine how much each additional dollar spent improves the lot of
the population it serves. At least two pieces of evidence suggest that Social
Security's ability to meet its anti-poverty standard has hit some roadblocks.
First, the significant increase in recent decades in the number of divorced
and never-married individuals indicates that a larger segment of society will
not qualify for spousal and survivors' benefits in retirement. Today, single
and divorced women in particular often accrue only moderate earnings intheir
working-age years, partly because of the amount of time many spend raising
children on their own. Early in its history, primarily to ensure income ade-
quacy for women with little or no earnings, the Social Security Act was
amended to include a system of spousal and survivors' benefits. This part of
the system was set up as essentially a pure transfer system because no addi-
tional contributions or taxes were required by a qualified individual and bene-
fits were not reduced. By contrast, in the private pension system, a worker
must reduce his or her own benefit to pay for additional spousal benefits.
While these public spousal and survivor benefits do provide old-age protec-
tion to many retirees, their size alone requires a separation of their marginal
from their average effect.
The particular design of this add-on transfer system of spousal and sur-
vivors' benefits creates inequities in benefits distribution. For example, add-
on spousal benefits are not tied to additional contributions; instead, the system
allocates benefits according to the prime beneficiary's earnings level. As a
consequence, spouses ofthe highest-earning workers receive the greatest bene-
fits. Meanwhile, dual-earner couples whose earnings are split fairly evenly
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between spouses will receive significantly fewer benefits than a one-earner
couple with the same total family income and tax payments. Even more
troubling in terms of anti-poverty protection, this add-on system supports the
most needy retirees the least. In particular, single heads of household - again,
mainly women with low incomes - do not benefit at all from spousal and sur-
vivors' benefits.
Recent Social Security Administration projections show that estimated
poverty rates among the elderly are likely to decline only a bit by 2020 if
current marriage and earnings patterns remain relatively steady. Meanwhile,
Social Security is scheduled to spend hundreds of billions of dollars by
providing an average of $3,254 (in constant 2001 dollars) more per recipient
per year.' Arguably, the increasing unavailability of supplemental benefits
to the individuals who need them the most helps account for the very small
projected decline in the poverty level despite the very large infusion of funds.
Note also that Social Security already paid out enough in 2000 to remove all
of the elderly from poverty. Such a low level of additional poverty reduction
for this much additional money does not make for a good marginal return.
The second indication that Social Security's anti-poverty agenda has hit
a road block is that the amount paid to the oldest retirees has steadily fallen
relative to benefits paid to younger (and more capable) retirees. In 1968, men
who were expected to live another ten or fewer years received fifty-two
percent of all Social Security benefits paid to men. By 1997, they received
only Thirty-eight percent." Under current law, the percentage of benefits
going to the oldest retirees is scheduled to decline even further. A major
reason for this shift is that people are retiring and receiving Social Security for
increasingly more years. Because retirees with longer expected life spans
have the most capacity to work and have the fewest chronic or acute health
problems, the program as currently designed provides a continually higher
percentage of benefits to retirees with fewer needs.
VI. Conclusion
While I do not expect any two people to come to the same policy conclu-
sions from the set of facts I have presented, I do hope that they will agree that
the Social Security debate is defined far too narrowly. What we face as a
society is the much broader question of how well we are going to allocate
scarce resources to meet the most important needs of our nation. Demographic
changes have merely forced this issue to the fore, but they would be there to
some extent anyway. The issue plays itself out in the three topics I have
10. See infra Appendix, Figure$, at 1253.
11. See infra Appendix, Figure 9, at 1254.
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raised here: the current and future allocation of the federal budget and how
those allocations are affected by automatic built-in growth of a few major
programs; the extent of future labor force participation by adults and how
current institutional structures may be blocking a very natural movement
toward work by what will soon be a very large stock of older - but not neces-
sarily old - people with significant capabilities; and the continual allocation
of decreasing shares of the elderly budget away from the those elderly with
the greatest needs.
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